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 “[C]yberstalking involves the use of the Internet, e-mail, or other means of 
electronic communication to stalk or harass another individual.”1 According to a 2014 
study by the Pew Research Center, forty per cent of Internet users indicated that they 
have personally experienced online harassment.2 This figure will rise with the 
increased use of smartphones and social media platforms like Facebook and Instagram, 
and the ease with which they allow potential victims to be located.3 Therefore, judicial 
decisions like People v. Marian4 are particularly troubling as they undermine law 
enforcement’s efforts to combat cyberstalking and weaken victims’ protections.
 In Marian, the defendant, Monique Marian, was charged in a misdemeanor 
complaint with two counts of stalking in the fourth degree, in violation of sections 
120.45(2) and 120.45(3) of the New York Penal Law (NYPL).5 Marian allegedly 
stalked the complainant, her ex-girlfriend, from January through April of 2015 by 
following the complainant around, sending unwanted e-mails to the complainant’s 
personal and work e-mail addresses, and barraging the complainant with phone calls 
and Instagram messages.6 In all of these communications, Marian expressed her 
desire to be with the complainant.7
 On May 18, 2015, Marian moved to dismiss the information8 on the ground that 
it failed to make out a prima facie9 case of stalking in the fourth degree under section 
1. Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current State and 
Federal Laws, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 125, 126 (2007).
2. Pew Research Ctr., Online Harassment 2 (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/10/PI_
OnlineHarassment_72815.pdf.
3. See Aarti Shahani, Smartphones Are Used to Stalk, Control Domestic Abuse Victims, NPR: All Tech 
Considered (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/ 
09/15/346149979/smartphones-are-used-to-stalk-control-domestic-abuse-victims; Alexandra Topping, 
Social Networking Sites Fuelling Stalking, Report Warns, Guardian (Feb. 1, 2012, 14.00 EST), https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/feb/01/social-media-smartphones-stalking.
4. 16 N.Y.S.3d 683 (Crim. Ct. 2015).
5. Id. at 685; see N.Y. Penal Law § 120.45(2)–(3) (McKinney 2017).
6. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 685–86.
7. Id. at 685.
8. Id. The misdemeanor complaint was converted to an “information.” Id. In misdemeanor cases in New 
York, the prosecution must replace a misdemeanor complaint with an information. N.Y. Crim. Proc. 
§ 170.65(1). This action is called a “conversion.” See id. Unless defendants waive this right, they may not 
be prosecuted and tried on misdemeanor complaints. 7 Lawrence K. Marks et al., New York 
Practice Series—New York Pretrial Criminal Procedure § 3:25, Westlaw (2d ed., database 
updated Apr. 2016). Since misdemeanor complaints generally contain hearsay allegations, more is 
required for the prosecution to continue. Id. Therefore, the misdemeanor complaint must be converted 
to an information, in which the prosecution must allege nonhearsay allegations which, if true, establish 
every element of the offense charged. Id.
9. Prima facie, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“At first sight; on first appearance but subject 
to further evidence or information.”); id. (“[Evidence that is] [s]ufficient to establish a fact or raise a 
presumption unless disproved or rebutted . . . .”).
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120.45(3) of the NYPL.10 The People did not answer.11 On July 14, 2015, the court 
issued its decision on the motion.12
 The court concurred with the defendant and held that the information failed to 
make out a prima facie case of stalking in the fourth degree under section 120.45(3) 
because it did not satisfy the statute’s requirement that the conduct occur at the 
victim’s “place of employment or business.”13 As a matter of first impression, the 
court held that a work e-mail address did not constitute a person’s “place of 
employment or business” as the term is used in section 120.45(3).14
 Instead, the court held that “place of employment or business” referred to an 
“actual, physical location.”15 It cited two civil cases in support of this position.16 In 
Rosario v. NES Medical Services of New York, P.C., the court noted that in the context 
of serving a summons and complaint under rule 308(2) of the New York Civil 
Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), a person’s “actual place of business” is “where the 
person is physically present with regularity” and where that person “regularly 
transact[s] business.”17 In the second case, In re Hille v. Gerald Records, the New York 
Court of Appeals held that a record executive’s home was his place of business 
because he frequently conducted his business there.18 From these holdings, the 
Marian court concluded that “actual, physical locations are simply not the same as an 
email address.”19
10. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 685–86.
11. Id. at 685.
12. Id. at 683. 
13. Id. at 686 (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 120.45(3) (McKinney 2017)).
14. Id. at 685. 
15. Id. at 687.
16. Id.
17. 963 N.Y.S.2d 295, 297 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Selmani v. City of New York, 954 N.Y.S.2d 580, 
581–82 (App. Div. 2012)). Rosario was a medical malpractice case. Id. at 296. The defendant medical 
providers appealed the lower court’s decision that denied their motion to dismiss the complaint. Id. In 
their motion to dismiss, the defendants argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction under rule 
3211(a)(8) of the CPLR because the summons was improperly served on them as required by rule 308(2) 
of the CPLR. Id. at 297. Rule 308(2) “permits personal service on a natural person ‘by delivering the 
summons within the state to a person of suitable age and discretion at the actual place of business.’” Id. 
(quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(2) (McKinney 2017)). However, on appeal, the second department affirmed 
the lower court’s ruling that the defendants had properly been served. Id. at 298.
18. 242 N.E.2d 816, 819 (N.Y. 1968). Hille involved a worker’s compensation claim. Id. at 818. Gerald Hille 
was president of Gerald Records, Inc., which was in the business of recording and releasing phonograph 
records. Id. at 817. Hille’s responsibilities included arranging recordings and editing tapes. Id. On 
August 31, 1962, he finished a recording session at a private studio in New York and was returning 
home to New Jersey when his car struck a utility pole, resulting in his death. Id. The issue on appeal was 
whether this accident occurred in the course of Hille’s employment for the purpose of a worker’s 
compensation claim. Id. at 817–18. The New York Court of Appeals held in the affirmative because 
Hille’s home also served as his place of employment. Id. at 819.
19. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 687.
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 The court also used the CPLR to guide its interpretation.20 It reasoned that it 
“ma[de] good sense, absent a contrary instruction from the Legislature, to interpret 
the same phrase in the same way across all areas of practice.”21 Since New York 
courts occasionally allowed service to e-mail addresses as an alternative method of 
service under rule 308(5) of the CPLR,22 the Marian court reasoned that e-mail 
addresses differ from actual, physical locations.23 Thus, the court held that the term 
“place of employment or business” would bear the same meaning in section 120.45(3) 
as it did in the CPLR to the exclusion of work e-mail addresses.24
 In conclusion, the court stated that to include e-mail addresses within the term 
“place of employment or business” would be contrary to the method by which NYPL 
provisions are to be construed: “according to the fair import of their terms to promote 
justice and effect the objects of the law.”25 The New York Court of Appeals has 
stated that the “fair import” analysis permits courts to “dispense with hypertechnical 
or strained interpretations of the statute.”26 The Marian court reasoned that such an 
interpretation would do nothing to further justice or the statute’s goals.27 Instead, the 
court pointed out that the act of stalking via e-mail was “completely subsumed within 
the conduct specified in [the preceding section] 120.45(2), which covers ‘telephoning 
or initiating communication or contact with’ the victim, including contact by email, 
irrespective of whether the email is sent to a personal or a work email address.”28 
Section 120.45(2) criminalizes stalking that occurs anywhere, while section 120.45(3) 
criminalizes stalking that harms a person at her “place of employment or business.”29 
For the foregoing reasons, the court found that the People failed to establish a prima 
20. Id. at 687–88.
21. Id. at 687.
22. Rule 308(5) of the CPLR affords courts discretion to determine the method of service for legal 
documents. It states that an individual may effect service upon a natural person “in such manner as the 
court, upon motion without notice, directs, if service is impracticable under paragraphs one, two and four of 
this section.” C.P.L.R. 308(5) (emphasis added). Courts have interpreted this language to allow service 
via e-mail. E.g., In re Keith X. v. Kristin Y., 2 N.Y.S.3d 268, 269 (App. Div. 2015) (discussing a family 
court order, which permitted service via e-mail under rule 308(5)).
23. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 687.
24. Id. at 687–88.
25. Id. at 687 (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 5.00 (McKinney 2017)).
26. People v. Ditta, 422 N.E.2d 515, 517 (N.Y. 1981). Using this analysis, “conduct that falls within the 
plain, natural meaning of the language of a Penal Law provision may be punished as criminal.” Id.
27. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 688.
28. Id. (quoting Penal § 120.45(2)).
29. Penal § 120.45(2)–(3). Sections 120.45(2) and 120.45(3) of the NYPL are different. According to 
section 120.45(2):
A person is guilty of stalking in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally, and for 
no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and 
knows or reasonably should know that such conduct:  .  .  . causes material harm to the 
mental or emotional health of such person, where such conduct consists of following, 
telephoning or initiating communication or contact with such person, a member of such 
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facie case of stalking in the fourth degree under section 120.45(3) and dismissed that 
count of the information.
 This case comment contends that the court erred in its holding. It argues that 
work e-mail addresses should be covered by the statute’s “place of employment or 
business” language. First, the Marian court erred by failing to engage in statutory 
analysis in contravention of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which holds that an 
analysis of statutory language is always the starting point in statutory interpretation 
cases, and New York State precedent, which extends this rule to language in the 
NYPL.30 The court should have analyzed the statutory language using the textualist 
approach of applying the semantic canons of construction to the text of the statute. 
Second, the court should have considered a Connecticut judicial decision that was 
based on similar facts and where the court interpreted a criminal statute similar to 
section 120.45(3) without analyzing civil practice guidelines and case law. Third, 
this decision will cause troubling consequences for victims of cyberstalking.
 The text of the statute is the starting point in all cases involving issues of statutory 
interpretation.31 The court violated this principle when it failed to conduct an analysis 
of the language of section 120.45(3). Instead, the court looked beyond the four 
corners of the statute and analyzed civil case law and the CPLR.32 Textualism, by 
contrast, “centers on the primacy of enacted text as the key tool in statutory 
interpretation.”33 “[T]extualists place a heavy emphasis on text and text-based 
interpretive rules (for example, dictionary definitions, textual ‘context,’ and the 
so-called ‘linguistic’ or ‘textual’ canons [or semantic canons]—default presumptions 
based on common rules of grammar and word usage).”34 The Marian court should 
have exhausted the textualist approach in its analysis before it looked beyond the 
statute. It should have used the semantic canons in its construction of section 
person’s immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted, and 
the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct[.]
 Id. § 120.45(2). The criminal conduct may occur anywhere so long as it involves initiating communication 
or contact with the victim. See id. However, under the terminology of section 120.45(3), the criminal 
conduct must occur at the “person’s place of employment or business.” Id. § 120.45(3). This case 
comment contends that, despite this distinction, the Marian court treated both sections similarly when 
it held that the defendant’s conduct was covered under section 120.45(2), thus making section 120.45(3) 
superf luous. See infra pp. 295–96.
30. See infra note 31.
31. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held “that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the 
language of the statute itself.” E.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 
102, 108 (1980). Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals has instructed lower courts to look to the 
statute as a “starting point” in statutory interpretation cases. State v. Patricia II., 844 N.E.2d 743, 745 
(N.Y. 2006). This method of statutory interpretation is commonly followed by New York courts 
construing the NYPL. See, e.g., People v. Torres, 708 N.Y.S.2d 578, 579 (Crim. Ct. 2000).
32. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 687–88.
33. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the 
New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1762 (2010).
34. Id. at 1763 (footnote omitted).
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120.45(3).35 Had it done so, it would have concluded that the statute’s “place of 
employment or business” language covered work e-mail addresses.
 Ejusdem generis is Latin for “of the same kind or class.”36 Pursuant to this canon, 
“when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase 
will be interpreted to include only items of the same class as those listed.”37 New 
York courts have consistently applied this canon in various areas of the law.38 
 The language of section 120.45(3) lends itself to the application of the ejusdem 
generis semantic canon of construction. Section 120.45(3) states:
A person is guilty of stalking in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally, 
and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a 
specific person, and knows or reasonably should know that such conduct: . . . 
is likely to cause such person to reasonably fear that his or her employment, 
business or career is threatened, where such conduct consists of appearing, 
telephoning or initiating communication or contact at such person’s place of 
employment or business, and the actor was previously clearly informed to 
cease that conduct.39
The statute itemizes “appearing” and “telephoning” and then follows these words by 
the more general language of “or initiating communication or contact.”40 Thus, 
35. Some have criticized the use of the semantic canons of construction on the grounds that there is no clear 
roadmap for selecting which canons to apply to the statutory text and which ones to disregard, and that 
“ judges deciding statutory interpretation cases simply invoke the canon that favors the result they wish 
to reach.” John F. Manning & Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislation and Regulation 205 
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed. 2010) (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950)). 
However, proponents of their use have contended that
in a wide array of situations, common sense or practical wisdom will inform judges’ 
decisions about which canon to employ in a given context. . . . [W]hile it is true that no 
meta-rule or formal model is available to instruct judges in picking and choosing among 
canons, in the same way that people who do not know the rules of grammar can employ 
grammatically correct language when speaking English, it seems plausible that judges 
can select among canons in a sensible and coherent fashion even in the absence of 
known rules to guide them.
 Id. at 207 (quoting Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and 
Judicial Preferences, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 647, 650–51 (1992)). Using the common sense approach articulated 
by Macey and Miller, this case comment contends that the court should have used the following canons 
in its construction of section 120.45(3): ejusdem generis, noscitur a sociis, the absurdity doctrine, the rule 
against surplusage, and in pari materia.
36. Ejusdem generis, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
37. Id.
38. See Abdulla v. Gross, 998 N.Y.S.2d 549, 551 (App. Div. 2015) (using the canon of ejusdem generis to 
interpret a release signed by a tenant); People v. Sengupta, 993 N.Y.S.2d 710, 711 (App. Div. 2014) 
(using the canon of ejusdem generis to limit the scope of the term “other instrument” in section 170.10(1) 
of the NYPL); In re Will of Delisa, No. 2010-362527/C, 2014 WL 7773986, at *2 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Sept. 
30, 2014) (using the canon of ejusdem generis to construe the terms of a will).
39. N.Y. Penal Law § 120.45(3) (McKinney 2017) (emphasis added).
40. Id.
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pursuant to the ejusdem generis canon, the words “communication or contact” should 
capture all communications or contacts that are of the same kind or class as the 
immediately preceding words: “appearing” and “telephoning.”
 What do the words “appearing” and “telephoning” tell us about the kinds of 
communications or contacts that are covered by section 120.45(3)? By definition, 
“appearing” requires a physical appearance at a physical location.41 By contrast, 
“telephoning” is a remote form of communication or contact that extinguishes the 
need for a physical appearance at a physical place.42 In short, “appearing” and 
“telephoning” are two different modes of communicating with or contacting others, 
the former requiring physical appearances at specific locations and the latter allowing 
for remote communications or contacts with others. Thus, pursuant to the canon of 
ejusdem generis, the general words “communication or contact” must be interpreted 
similarly. The interpretation must capture all actions that involve the kinds of 
physical communications or contacts that “appearing” does as well as the kinds of 
remote communications or contacts that “telephoning” does.
 If the term “communication or contact” includes both physical and remote 
communications and contacts, as the ejusdem generis analysis suggests, “place of 
employment or business” cannot be limited to physical locations as the Marian court 
concluded. The Marian court’s decision would have made sense if section 120.45(3) 
only included the verb “appearing.” However, the statute also uses the verb 
“telephoning,”43 which suggests that the terms of the statute should cover the act of 
remotely communicating with another’s “place of employment or business.” Therefore, 
when the ejusdem generis analysis is combined with the remainder of section 120.45(3), 
the term “place of employment or business” should cover physical locations and the 
remote modes of communication used to initiate contact with those locations, such as 
telephone numbers and work e-mail addresses.
 The court should also have used the noscitur a sociis canon in its statutory analysis 
of section 120.45(3). Noscitur a sociis is Latin for “it is known by its associates.”44 
According to this canon, “the meaning of an unclear word or phrase, esp[ecially] one 
in a list, should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it.”45 New York 
41. Since “appearing” is the present participle of the word “appear,” it is best to define the root word. 
Merriam-Webster’s definitions of the word “appear” include: “to be or come in sight”; “to show up”; and 
“to come into public view.” Appear, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
appear (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
42. Since “telephoning” is the present participle of the word “telephone,” it is best to define the root word. 
Merriam-Webster defines “telephone” as “an instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance [that are] 
converted into electrical impulses for transmission” and the verb form as “to speak to or attempt to reach 
by telephone,” “to send by telephone,” and “to communicate by telephone.” Telephone, Merriam-
Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/telephone (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
43. Penal § 120.45(3).




courts have consistently applied this canon in various areas of the law.46 Had the 
court interpreted the term “place of employment or business” in context, specifically 
in relation to the language, “where such conduct consists of appearing, telephoning 
or initiating communication or contact,”47 it would have applied a broader meaning 
that would have covered remote communications and contacts.
 When a case involves statutory interpretation, the court must always “presum[e] . . . 
that the legislature intended to enact only that which is reasonable, and that no 
unreasonable or absurd result was intended by the legislature.”48 This is known as the 
absurdity doctrine.49 “[E]ach part of a statute is to be given meaning and be interpreted 
so as to avoid absurd results.”50 Thus, in the absence of clear legislative intent, a court 
must interpret all ambiguous language rationally and sensibly.51 New York courts have 
consistently applied this canon in various areas of the law.52
 If the court had used the absurdity doctrine, it would have realized that its own 
interpretation was absurd because it captures the one form of remote communication 
explicitly referenced in the statute—“telephoning”—but not others, like e-mail. It is 
highly unlikely that the legislature intended such a result. And the legislative history 
suggests as much. The court was correct when it stated, “the inclusion of a provision 
dealing with stalking in connection with the victim’s employment is not specifically 
discussed in the legislative history to § 120.45.”53 However, the legislative history 
shows that the legislature intended this statute to be interpreted broadly. In 1999, 
when the legislature passed this law, it expressed its intent in the following way:
The legislature finds and declares that criminal stalking behavior, including 
threatening, violent or other criminal conduct has become more prevalent in 
New York state in recent years. The unfortunate reality is that stalking victims 
46. See Expedia, Inc. v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Fin., 3 N.E.3d 121, 127 (N.Y. 2013) (using noscitur a sociis to 
interpret the term “charge” in a challenged local law); NFL v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 824 N.Y.S.2d 72, 73, 77 
(App. Div. 2006) (using noscitur a sociis to interpret the terms of an insurance policy); People v. Cuesta, 
901 N.Y.S.2d 825, 828–29 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (using noscitur a sociis to interpret section 70.06 of the 
NYPL); People v. Conti, 895 N.Y.S.2d 660, 665 (Dunkirk City Ct. 2010) (using noscitur a sociis to 
interpret the term “school” in a local city code).
47. Penal § 120.45(3).
48. 97 N.Y. Jur. 2d Statutes § 191 (2017) (footnotes omitted).
49. Absurdity Doctrine, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“The principle that a provision in a legal 
instrument may be either disregarded or judicially corrected as an error  .  .  . if failing to do so would 
result in a disposition that no reasonable person could approve.”).
50. 97 N.Y. Jur. 2d, supra note 48, § 191.
51. Id.
52. See In re Raritan Dev. Corp. v. Silva, 689 N.E.2d 1373, 1374 & n.1, 1376 (N.Y. 1997) (finding that 
“cellar space” was excluded from f loor area ratio calculations and that, contrary to the dissent’s 
contention, such an interpretation was not “absurd”); Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., 874 
N.Y.S.2d 97, 99, 105 (App. Div. 2009) (using the absurdity doctrine to determine whether the lower 
court had properly interpreted various provisions of the Rent Stabilization Law); In re R.A. Bronson, 
Inc. v. Franklin Corr. Facility, 680 N.Y.S.2d 719, 720–21 (App. Div. 1998) (using the absurdity doctrine 
to reject the petitioner’s interpretation of section 2051-e(9) of the Public Authorities Law).
53. People v. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d 683, 688 (Crim. Ct. 2015).
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have been intolerably forced to live in fear of their stalkers. Stalkers who 
repeatedly follow, phone, write, confront, threaten or otherwise unacceptably 
intrude upon their victims, often inflict immeasurable emotional and physical 
harm upon them. Current law does not adequately recognize the damage to public 
order and individual safety caused by these offenders. Therefore, our laws must be 
strengthened to provide clear recognition of the dangerousness of stalking.
 . . . . 
 .  .  . This act will protect victims by providing real and effective sanctions for 
stalking conduct even at its earliest stages.54
Evidently, the legislature wanted courts to interpret section 120.45 broadly to 
effectively combat stalking, which in 1999 was considered a growing problem. Thus, 
it likely would have rejected the Marian court’s narrow interpretation of this statute.55 
 The court should have also used the rule against surplusage. According to this rule:
 In the interpretation of a statute, the legislature will be presumed to have 
inserted every part thereof for a purpose. As a general rule, a statute should 
be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions so that no part will be 
inoperative or superf luous, void or insignificant. It should not be presumed 
that any provision of a statute is redundant. . . .
 Effect should be given, if possible, to every section, paragraph, sentence 
or clause, phrase, and word of a statute.56
New York courts have consistently applied this canon in various areas of the law.57
 The Marian court’s interpretation of section 120.45(3) violated the rule against 
surplusage. The court stated that the act of stalking another person by e-mail 
messages to her work e-mail address would not go unpunished because such conduct 
was “completely subsumed within the conduct specified in § 120.45(2).”58 However, 
under this logic, the next subsection, section 120.45(3), is superfluous since, as the 
court suggests, section 120.45(2) captures the same kind of conduct covered by 
section 120.45(3).59 While the court indicated that it was differentiating conduct 
54. Clinic Access and Anti-Stalking Act of 1999, ch. 635, § 2, 1999 N.Y. Laws 3365, 3365 (codified as 
amended at N.Y. Penal Law § 120.45 (McKinney 2017)) (emphasis added).
55. Moreover, the legislative history indicates that the legislature mentioned another remote form of 
communication: writing. Id. Therefore, the Marian court should have broadly interpreted the term 
“place of employment or business” to cover work e-mail addresses.
56. 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 156 (2016) (footnotes omitted).
57. See FCI Grp., Inc. v. City of New York, 862 N.Y.S.2d 352, 356 (App. Div. 2008) (using the canon to 
reject the defendant’s interpretation of a contractual provision because “[s]uch an interpretation, 
moreover, renders the language limiting the scope of the [alternative dispute resolution] provision mere 
surplusage, in contravention of the settled rule that a contract is to be construed so as to give effect to 
each and every part”); URS Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 979 N.Y.S.2d 506, 511 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (using 
the canon to reject the plaintiff ’s reading of the defendant’s insurance policy because “[t]o read the terms 
‘land,’ ‘atmosphere’ and ‘watercourse or body of water’ as ‘everywhere’ would render the modifying 
clause misleading and useless surplusage”).
58. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 688. 
59. See supra note 29.
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according to how it defined “at” the workplace (as a physical location), the effect of 
its decision detracts from the independent functions of sections 120.45(2) and 
120.45(3).
 A fundamental premise of the superf luity canon is that courts should avoid 
construing statutory provisions in ways that detract from their independent 
functions.60 The court’s reasoning subtracts from the function that the legislature 
intended section 120.45(3) to serve because it conflates the separate types of conduct 
remedied by this section and section 120.45(2). Further, the effect of the court’s 
holding is that harassing behavior that hurts a victim’s ability to do her job is not 
within 120.45(3) when the victim is outside her work building, despite that the 
hindrance to job performance is what section 120.45(3) is meant to prevent. But 
post-Marian, any victim in New York County whose business exists solely online 
does not have a remedy under section 120.45(3).61 The court’s holding confuses the 
purpose of section 120.45(3) and diminishes its ability to remedy harassing conduct 
that hinders job performance, thus violating the superfluity canon.
 In pari materia is Latin for “in the same matter.”62 According to this canon, 
“statutes that are in pari materia may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in 
one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the same subject.”63 New 
York courts have consistently applied this canon in various areas of the law.64
 The court violated the canon of in pari materia when it used the CPLR and civil 
case law interpreting it to decipher the meaning of the term “place of employment or 
business” in a penal statute. The court recognized that it was out of the ordinary to 
use the CPLR in penal cases65 but nevertheless concluded that it “ma[de] good sense, 
absent a contrary instruction from the Legislature, to interpret the same phrase in 
the same way across all areas of practice.”66 Without expressly stating it, the court 
applied the in pari materia canon, albeit erroneously. In fact, it violated the canon 
because New York courts have long held that the CPLR is not in pari materia with 
60. See 73 Am. Jur. 2d, supra note 56, § 156.
61. The Census Bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce has determined that U.S. retail e-commerce 
sales have been steadily increasing. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail 
E-Commerce Sales 3rd Quarter 2016 tbl. 1 (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/
data/pdf/ec_current.pdf. E-commerce composed 8.4% of total retail sales in the third quarter of 2016, a 
15.7% increase from the third quarter of 2015. Id.
62. In pari materia, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
63. Id.
64. See In re Fitzpatrick v. County of Orange, 991 N.Y.S.2d 246, 250–51 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (using the in pari 
materia canon to find that there was no meaningful distinction between the two standards laid out in 
each statute); In re Russo v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 986 N.Y.S.2d 800, 816 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (treating both 
parties’ regulatory schemes in pari materia because “both  .  .  . speak on the same matter or subject—
affordable housing for low and/or middle income residents”).
65. People v. Marian, 16 N.Y.S.3d 683, 687 (Crim. Ct. 2015) (citing People v. DeFreitas, 9 N.Y.S.3d 822, 
824 (Crim. Ct. 2015)).
66. Id.
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the NYPL and that one cannot be used to construe the meaning of the other.67 
Therefore, the court erred when it used the CPLR to construe the term “place of 
employment or business” in section 120.45(3).
 Instead of analyzing the CPLR, the court should have taken guidance from case 
law that interpreted similarly worded penal statutes in other states. A majority of 
states have cyberstalking or cyberharassment statutes.68 There are three types of 
cyberstalking statutes: those that do not expressly mention cyberstalking, those that 
address some aspects of cyberstalking, and those that address it expressly.69 Section 
120.45 falls into this first category of statutes70 because, while it does mention 
“appearing,” “telephoning,” and “initiating communication or contact,” it does not 
expressly use the phrase “electronic communication.”71 The same is true of 
Connecticut’s stalking statute.72 In fact, Connecticut’s statute contains similar 
language to that in section 120.45(3). It states, in relevant part:
A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when:
 . . . .
(2) [s]uch person intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a 
course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable 
person to fear that such person’s employment, business or career is threatened, 
where (A) such conduct consists of the actor telephoning to, appearing at or 
initiating communication or contact at such other person’s place of employment 
or business . . . .73
Like section 120.45(3), this statute does not mention “electronic communications.” 
Despite this, in Marino v. Greene, a Connecticut court held that this language 
covered the respondent’s sanctioning of her husband’s acts of stalking the victim by 
e-mail and Facebook messaging.74
 The Marian court should have followed the Marino decision in interpreting 
section 120.45(3). In Marino, the applicant, Kayla Marino, a twenty-seven-year-old 
single mother of two, prayed the court to issue a civil order of protection against the 
respondent, Susan Greene, a patron at the restaurant where she worked as a waitress.75 
67. See Perry v. People, 86 N.Y. 353, 357 (1881). By contrast, the NYPL and the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, both of which relate to criminal law, have been held to be in pari materia. People v. Buccolieri, 
152 N.Y.S. 707, 714 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1914).
68. See Steven D. Hazelwood & Sarah Koon-Magnin, Cyber Stalking and Cyber Harassment Legislation in the 
United States: A Qualitative Analysis, 7 Int’l J. Cyber Criminology 155, 159 (2013).
69. Goodno, supra note 1, at 141–44. 
70. This category makes no express reference to electronic communications. See id. at 141.
71. See N.Y. Penal Law § 120.45 (McKinney 2017).
72. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-181d (2016).
73. Id. § 53a-181d(b)(2) (emphasis added).
74. Marino v. Greene, No. LLICV154015225S, 2015 WL 1727430, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 20, 2015).
75. Id. at *1–3. Kayla Marino had previously filed an application for an order of protection against Edward 
Greene, Susan Greene’s husband. Id. at *2. In that case, the court extended the order of protection 
against Mr. Greene for one year. Id. The discussion above concerns the case against Susan Greene.
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Initially, the respondent showed interest in Marino’s well-being, and even once 
helped her wrap Christmas gifts for her daughters.76 Later, the respondent’s husband, 
Edward Greene, began sending messages to the applicant via social media.77 Over 
time, Mr. Greene’s electronic communications became inappropriate.78 On one 
occasion, he asked Marino to send him nude photos of herself.79 Additionally, Mr. 
Greene frequented the restaurant where Marino was employed and asked her 
coworkers deeply personal questions about her, including asking for her home 
address, the reasons for her failed marriage, and whether her children had the same 
biological father.80 The applicant eventually blocked the respondent and her husband 
on Facebook, but the inappropriate electronic communications continued via e-mail.81
 Section 46b-16a of the Connecticut General Statutes (“General Statutes”) 
governs the issuance of civil protection orders.82 According to the statute, “[a]ny 
person who has been the victim of sexual abuse, sexual assault or stalking, as 
described in section[]  .  .  . 53a-181d  .  .  . may make an application to the Superior 
Court for relief under this section  .  .  .  .”83 To determine whether the applicant was 
entitled to an order of protection, the court turned to section 53a-181d for the 
definition of “stalking.”84 Section 53a-181d of the General Statutes does not use the 
term “electronic communications,” and yet the Marino court held:
[T]he respondent engaged in multiple acts, through electronic media and in 
person, directly and indirectly, as well as through a third party (her husband) 
in which she followed, lay in wait for, monitored, observed, threatened, 
harassed, and communicated with the applicant. The respondent knowingly 
engaged in a course of conduct directed at the applicant that would cause a 
reasonable person to fear for such person’s physical safety. Further, the 
respondent’s actions at the applicant’s place of employment, and the actions of 
her husband which, the court finds, were sanctioned by the respondent, 
would cause a reasonable person to fear that her employment or career is 
threatened, in that the respondent’s conduct consisted of the respondent 
appearing at, or initiating communication or contact at, the applicant’s place 
of employment . . . .85
76. Id. at *3.
77. Id. The husband’s name is spelled “Green” in the court documents but this was possibly an error. See 





82. Id. at *1.
83. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-16a (2016).
84. Marino, 2015 WL 1727430, at *1.
85. Id. at *4.
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The Marino court found that section 53a-181d of the General Statutes, which is 
similar to section 120.45(3), covered stalking via e-mail and messages through 
Facebook, a social media platform. Thus, the Marian court should have considered 
this decision in resolving the issue in its case because both cases dealt with similar 
facts, in that the Marian case also involved a victim who was stalked via e-mail and 
messages through a social media platform: Instagram.
 The Marian court’s misguided approach to statutory interpretation will have 
devastating consequences for victims of cyberstalking. Stalking can cause post-
traumatic stress disorder, depression, and serious emotional distress, and can escalate 
into physical attacks.86 Given the increasing prevalence of cyberstalking, more people 
are likely to suffer these consequences.87 Unlike traditional stalkers, “[c]yberstalkers 
can use the Internet to instantly harass their victims with wide dissemination.”88 
Additionally, cyberstalkers can prey on their victims remotely from different states 
and even from different countries.89 The Internet provides cyberstalkers with a cheap 
and easy way to make the lives of their victims miserable.90 For example, they can 
easily impersonate their victims.91 The Internet also affords cyberstalkers newer and 
more improved methods of stalking. For example, cyberstalkers can remain 
anonymous and can employ third-parties to do the stalking for them.92 All of these 
factors make it easier for cyberstalkers to harass their victims, and with judicial 
decisions like Marian, it will become even easier for them to do so and harder for 
victims to get the help they need.
 The Marian decision comes at a time when cyberstalking is on the rise. According 
to a 2011 survey, 14.3% of female victims and 9.4% of their male counterparts were 
electronically stalked via unwanted e-mail messages, instant messages, or social 
media messages.93 In addition, 55.3% of female victims and 56.7% of male victims 
were targeted via text or voice messages.94 With the proliferation of smartphones and 
86. Goodno, supra note 1, at 128.
87. See Alexandra Katehakis, Cyberstalking: Fastest Growing Crime, Huffington Post: Blog (May 6, 
2016), http://www.huff ingtonpost.com/alexandra-katehakis-mft/cyberstalking-fasting-growing-
crime_b_6810154.html.
88. Goodno, supra note 1, at 128.
89. Id. at 129.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 131 (“[P]retending to be the victim, the cyberstalker can send lewd e-mails, post inf lammatory 
messages on multiple bulletin boards, and offend hundreds of chat room participants. The victim is 
then banned from bulletin boards, accused of improper conduct, and f looded with threatening messages 
from those the stalker offended in the victim’s name.”).
92. Id. at 130, 132. 
93. Matthew J. Breiding et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of Sexual Violence, Stalking, and Intimate Partner 
Violence Victimization—National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, United States, 2011, 63 




social media websites, these statistics will likely increase, leaving more victims 
helpless in the face of their vicious and persistent stalkers.
 Marian exemplifies why courts should engage in proper statutory interpretation. 
Had the Marian court conducted a careful examination and analysis of the statutory 
text, it would have concluded that the term “place of employment or business” covered 
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